Justice Scalia’s Use of Sources in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: How Congress Always Loses by Stock, Arthur





I. INTRODUCTION: SOURCES ARE IMPORTANT TO JUSTICE SCALIA
For Justice Scalia, sources of arguments matter. According to Jus-
tice Scalia, the Constitution limits the sources courts may cite in written
opinions. One source Justice Scalia views as improper is the legislative
history compiled by Congress. Though his antipathy toward legislative
history was known before he joined the Supreme Court,1 over time he
has reasserted this view with renewed vigor.
However, Justice Scalia uses a different rule for sources of authority
in his constitutional opinions. Although he adheres to a "textualist" ap-
proach when interpreting statutes, he adopts an "originalist" stance with
regard to the Constitution. These theories of interpretation profoundly
differ: The textualist looks only at the words of a statute, whereas the
originalist examines both the words and additional sources that shed
light on what the words originally were intended to mean.
This Note examines Justice Scalia's choices and uses of sources in
his statutory and constitutional opinions. The reasons he gives for his
inconsistent treatment of sources fail to persuade, and a case could be
made that precisely the opposite approach would be more appropriate.
Yet perhaps the most significant aspect of Justice Scalia's approach to the
use of sources (in either statutory or constitutional adjudication) is the
effect it has on redistributing power among the three branches of govern-
ment. Refusing to consult legislative history reduces the power of the
legislative branch, and it allows both the executive (especially including
administrative agencies) and the judiciary more room to promulgate and
pursue their own views. In contrast, willingness to consult the Constitu-
tion's "legislative history" again reduces the power of the legislative
branch: The judicial rather than the legislative interpretation of a consti-
tutional provision is more likely to determine whether the statute in ques-
tion is unconstitutional. As long as the legislative branch is controlled by
1. See Comment, The Appellate Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, 54 U. CHI. L. REv.
705, 722-26 (1987).
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a different political party than controls the other branches, Justice
Scalia's interpretive practices have clear practical consequences.
II. ESCHEWING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
A. The Rule
Justice Scalia has not hidden his disdain for the use of legislative
history. He would be happy if Congress produced no legislative history
at all,2 and he thinks it has no place in determining the "ordinary mean-
ing' 3 or the constitutionality4 of a statute.
In a large number of opinions, Justice Scalia avoids using legislative
history in a statutory interpretation simply by asserting that the Court
could have reached the same result based on the language of the statute.5
Justice Scalia's position in these concurrences can be understood best as
an argument for judicial economy. Every canon of statutory construc-
tion supports the conclusion that the court should start from the text of
the statute. 6 If the statutory text supplies an answer to the issue, the
judge need not delve further into the legislative record. When statutory
language is clear, the judge would only use the legislative history to con-
firm what she already discovered. And even if the judge finds a clear
conflict between the legislative history and statutory language, common
precepts of statutory construction would require her to ignore the legisla-
tive history in interpreting the statute.7
Another reason Justice Scalia suggests for ignoring legislative his-
tory is the process by which some committee reports are generated. In
2. Sable Communications v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2840 (1989) (concurring) ("Neither due
process nor the First Amendment requires legislation to be supported by committee reports, floor
debates, or even consideration, but only by a vote.").
This Note varies Bluebook style by presuming that all decisions, whether majority, concurrence,
or dissent, are authored by Justice Scalia, unless otherwise indicated.
3. Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 109 S. Ct. 1981, 1994 (1989) (concurring in the
judgment).
4. Sable Communications, 109 S. Ct. at 2840; see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
610-40 (1987) (dissenting). But see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 701 (1988) (dissenting) (draw-
ing on a Conference report to demonstrate unconstitutionality of Ethics in Government Act).
5. See, eg., Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702, 2724 (1989) (concurring) ("I
join Parts I and IV of the Court's opinion, and Part III except insofar as it relies upon legislative
history."); H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2907 (1989) (concurring) (deriding
the majority opinion for "[e]levating to the level of statutory text a phrase taken from the legislative
history.").
6. For a traditional account of the canons of statutory interpretation, see R. DICKERSON, THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES (1975).
7. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 96 (concurring) ("I also agree with
the Court that the Indiana Control Shares Act is not pre-empted by the Williams Act, but I reach
that conclusion without entering into the debate over the purposes of the two statutes."). Justice
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Hirschey v.. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, a widely publicized
concurrence he wrote as a judge on the District of Columbia Circuit,
Justice Scalia criticized the majority's reliance on a committee report
published when the Equal Access to Justice Act was extended without
changes." In this report, the committee had asserted it was in agreement
with the D.C. Circuit, and believed the Ninth Circuit had misinterpreted
the law. Scalia wrote:
It is most interesting that the House Committee rejected the interpre-
tation of the Ninth Circuit, and perhaps that datum should be ac-
corded the weight of an equivalently unreasoned law review article.
But the authoritative, as opposed to the persuasive, weight of the Re-
port depends entirely upon how reasonable it is to assume that that
rejection was reflected in the law which Congress adopted. I frankly
doubt that it is ever reasonable to assume that the details, as opposed
to the broad outlines of purpose, set forth in a committee report come
to the attention of, much less are approved by, the house which enacts
the committee's bill. And I think it time for courts to become con-
cerned about the fact that routine deference to the detail of committee
reports, and the predictable expansion in that detail which routine def-
erence has produced, are converting a system of judicial construction
into a system of committee-staff prescription. 9
Justice Scalia also illustrated the problem of relying on legislative history
through a comical excerpt from the Congressional Record in which Sen-
ator Dole conceded that neither he nor any other Senator actually had
written the committee report, and no Senator had read it in its entirety. 10
Scalia elaborated on this point in United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 345 (1988) (concurring in
part):
The text is so unambiguous on these points that it must be assumed that what the Members
of the House and the Senators thought they were voting for, and what the President
thought he was approving when he signed the bill, was what the text plainly said, rather
than what a few Representatives, or even a Committee, said it said.
Interestingly, he usually makes this point in a concurrence, not a dissent, since he usually reaches the
same conclusion as the other Justices.
8. Hirschey v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(concurring).
9. Id This passage attracted some attention at Judge Scalia's subsequent nomination hearing.
See Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 99TH CONG., 2D SaSS. 65-67 (1986) [hereinafter
Confirmation Hearings] (statement of Senator Grassley).
This stands in stark contrast to Justice Scalia's broad reliance on rules or adjudications pro-
duced by an administrative agency rather than a legislative committee (regardless of whether the
cabinet secretary ever had any inkling of what the subordinates were producing): "[W]e will defer,
of course, to FERC's construction if it does not violate plain meaning and is a reasonable interpreta-
tion of silence or ambiguity." Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S.
354, 380 (1988) (concurring).
10. Hirschey, 777 F.2d at 7. Justice Scalia's interpretation of this piece of legislative history, as
well as his general antipathy to using legislative history in any context, is criticized in Farber &
Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. RaV. 423, 437-52 (1988). Professors Farber
[Vol. 1990:160
JUSTICE SCALIA v CONGRESS
The theme that staffers rather than Members of Congress create leg-
islative history also appears in Blanchard v. Bergeron, which also in-
volved interpretation of the Equal Access to Justice Act.11 Here, his
concern was that Justice White's majority opinion began from the prem-
ise that a group of cases named in the committee report accompanying
the Equal Access to Justice Act, which the committee highlighted as ex-
amples of proper interpretations. Again, Justice Scalia asserted that
Members of Congress were ignorant of the contents of the report. 12 Af-
ter proclaiming congressional ignorance, he highlighted what for him
was the galling psychology of the members of committee staffs: "What a
heady feeling it must be for a young staffer, to know that his or her cita-
tion of obscure district court cases can transform them into the law of the
land .... -"13 Justice Scalia refused to join the majority opinion because
its process of analysis was "neither compatible with our judicial responsi-
bility or assuring reasoned, consistent and effective application of the
statutes of the United States, nor conducive to a genuine effectuation of
congressional intent, to give legislative force to each snippet of analysis
"14
Justice Scalia brought together several reasons for rejecting legisla-
tive history in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co. 15 That case involved
a county prisoner on work-release who was seriously injured by an alleg-
edly defective car washing machine at his place of employment. After
the prisoner testified at trial, the defendant's attorney sought to impeach
him by questioning him about his criminal record. The plaintiff argued
that the case turned on the meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a),
and Frickey provide a larger context for the snippet of legislative history, and conclude that in fact
Senator Dole did claim to have reviewed the Committee Report, and did vouch for its accuracy. See
generally Costello, Average Voting Members and other "Benign Fictions" The Relative Reliability of
Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 67.
Another criticism of this passage is that it came from a piece of legislation unrelated to the
legislation at issue in Hirschey. Finding one piece of legislative history not produced according to
proper procedures does not prove that other legislative history does not merit reliance. By analogy,
Justice Scalia could argue that because some Supreme Court decisions were written by clerks rather
than judges, all Supreme Court opinions should be ignored.
11. 109 S. Ct. 939, 946 (1989) (concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
12. I am confident that only a small proportion of the Members of Congress read either
one of the Committee Reports in question, even if (as is not always the case) the Reports
happened to have been been published before the vote; that very few of those who did read
them set off for the nearest law library to check out what was actually said in the four cases
at issue ... and that no Member of Congress came to the judgment that District Court
cases would trump Johnson on the point at issue issue here ....
Id. at 947.
13. Id. This is one of the few sentences in any recent Supreme Court opinon that probably was
not written by a law clerk.
14. Id. For a critique of this argument, see infra text accompanying note 68.
15. 109 S. Ct. 1981, 1994 (1989) (concurring).
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which allows the introduction of evidence of prior convictions for im-
peachment only when "the court determines that the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant
.. ... 16 The trial judge had not weighed the prejudicial effect in this
case, believing that Rule 609(a)(1) applies only to criminal proceedings-
the reference to "defendant" meant "criminal defendant." Justice Ste-
vens examined a lengthy history of Bar Association committee reports,
running back several decades, to find the district court's understanding of
the Rule was correct. 17
Justice Scalia found this method of determining the issue to be
wrong because it presumed an implausible degree of knowledge on the
part of Members of Congress:
I find no reason to believe that any more than a handful of the Mem-
bers of Congress who enacted Rule 609 were aware of its interesting
evolution from the 1942 Model Code; or that any more than a handful
of them (if any) voted.., on the basis of the referenced statements in
the Subcommittee, Committee, or Conference Committee Reports, or
floor debates .... 18
Justice Scalia then noted that the controversy could be limited to
whether the word "defendant" meant "criminal defendant," "civil plain-
tiff, civil defendant and criminal defendant," or "civil plaintiff, civil de-
fendant, prosecutor and criminal defendant." 19 Because the first solution
was most consistent with the meaning of the text, Justice Scalia consid-
ered the district court's interpretation correct. No need to go further,
according to Justice Scalia, and Justice Stevens' historical analysis was
not only superfluous but also insidious, since it "produc[es] a legal cul-
ture in which, when counsel arguing before us assert that 'Congress has
said' something, they now frequently mean, by 'Congress,' a committee
report ... ."20 Justice Scalia saw no need to explain why such a legal
culturewould be undesirable.
16. FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
17. Green, 109 S. Ct. at 1986 (1942 ALI proposal) (Stevens, J., majority); id. (1953 National
Conf. of Comm'rs report); id. at 1987 nn.16 & 17 (1969 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of
Evidence); id. at 1988 (1971 Advisory Committee Draft). Justice Stevens also considered several
conventional committee reports.
18. Id. at 1994 (concurring in the judgment). "Defendant" could not mean "civil or criminal
defendant" because this would create an uneven distribution of advantage in civil cases, an "absurd
result."
19. Id. Justice Blackmun, in dissent, argued that the plain language should be interpreted in
conjunction with Rule 102, "to secure fairness in administration," and that allowing the benefit of
weighing evidence to all litigants best achieves this result. Id. at 1997 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(quoting FED. R. EVID. 102). He agreed with Justice Scalia that "almost all [of the majority opin-
ion's] history is entitled to very little weight." Id. at 1996.
20. Id. at 1995.
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Finally, Justice Scalia contends that legislative history should be ig-
nored because it may not be directly related to the vote of legislators. In
Edwards v. Aguillard the majority, relying in part on some legislators'
stated intentions, found that a Louisiana statute requiring high schools to
teach "creation science" as well as "evolution science" in biology courses
violated the first amendment's establishment clause.21 In his dissent, Jus-
tice Scalia derided the majority's reliance on legislative intentions. After
an extensive analysis of the legislative history, which Justice Scalia found
conformed to the requirements set forth in past Supreme Court prece-
dents that legislation have some secular purpose,22 he argued that the
legislative history was irrelevant. If a legislator asserted that he had acci-
dentally pressed the "yes" button instead of the "no" button during a
vote, and if it was clear that this mistake passed a law that otherwise
would have been defeated, then this aspect of "legislative history" would
not invalidate the law. A showing of non-intention is irrelevant to the
constitutional validity of the law. The same would be true if legislative
history indicated that a legislator had been influenced by a deal to gain
support for an unrelated bill, a desire to get a session over with so he
could go fishing, or any other factor irrelevant to the merits of the pro-
posed Act. Therefore, Scalia argued, the fact that a legislator might have
been influenced by his religious beliefs also should be irrelevant.
23
B. Separation of Powers as a Justification for Prohibiting the Use of
Legislative History
Unique among his brethren on the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia
has asserted that there is a constitutional reason for ignoring legislative
history. The Constitution itself limits the legislature to a specific role:
Congress may pass laws on topics listed in the Constitution, 24 and it
must accomplish the legislative task according to the method set forth in
21. 482 U.S. 579, 591-94 (1987) (Brennan, J., majority). The result was based in part on the
finding that the legislature intended for the particular legislation to grant approval to one branch of
evangelical Christianity. See id.
22. Id. at 619-36 (dissenting).
23. Id. at 636-37. However, it is central to a wide range of constitutional cases and statutory
cases that even where a particular action was totally discretionary in the governmental actor, it
could not be undertaken for a "wrong" motive. Justice Scalia implicitly endorsed this view in J.A.
Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. 706, 735 (1989) (concurring), where he agreed that
although a city may hire any contractor or no contractor, it may not choose one contractor over
another on the basis of skin color.
24. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. He also would presumably recognize the rights of Congress to
act on impeachments, and on procedural matters to the extent these are enumerated in id. art. I, § 2,
cl. 5 (choice of Speaker of the House); id. § 3, cl. 5 (choice of Senate officers); id. § 4, cl. 1 (limited
power on regulation of elections of members); id. § 5 (determination of internal rules, procedural
rules for debate, and adjournment).
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the Constitution.25 The creation of legislative history is not among the
constitutional duties.26 Further, the process of creating statutes must in-
clude votes by both legislative branches on bills with identical wording
and a presidential signature (or the override of a veto)-without this pro-
cess, no legislation has been passed.27 Accordingly, the legislative his-
tory, which has not been subjected to review by the other house and the
President, is not part of the law. To complete the circle, the Constitu-
tion limits the courts to considering "Cases... arising under this Consti-
tution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties .... - 28 Courts have
no jurisdiction to review controversies arising under a provision of legis-
lative history.29
According to this theory, congressional intimations that courts
should consider the legislative history of a statute may be outside the
scope of congressional powers, and an unconstitutional attempt at con-
gressional self-aggrandizement. 30 Courts charged with enforcing article I
of the Constitution and with the balancing of powers implicit in the con-
25. Id. art. I, § 7.
26. But see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 ("Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings,
and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their Judgment require
secrecy .... '). Arguably, this provision makes the creation of a legislative history mandatory. The
Supreme Court's only ruling on this clause allowed the legislative branches complete discretion on
what must be included in the journal. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 671 (1892) ("[MWhether bills,
orders, resolutions, reports, and amendments shall be entered at large on the journal, or only re-
ferred to by their titles or by numbers; these and like matters were left to the discretion of the
respective houses of Congress."). The House and Senate have indeed decided to make committee
reports mandatory. See infra notes and text accompanying notes 68-71.
27. Puerto Rico v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 494, 501 (1988) (majority) ("There is no text
here ... to which the expressions of pre-emptive intent in legislative history might attach....
[Ulnenacted approvals, beliefs, and desires are not laws.").
28. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 6. This might appear to preclude consideration of state law by a
federal court. However, the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982), states, "The laws of the
several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress
otherwise require or provide shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the
United States .... "
29. Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (majority).
30. This theory raises the interesting question of whether a statute mimicking the language of
28 U.S.C. § 1652, quoted at supra note 28, but substituting "congressional legislative history" for
"laws of the several states" would be constitutional. Conceivably, the Court's willfully ignoring
legislative history might motivate Congress to pass such a statute.
The "Biden Condition" attached to the Senate's ratification of the INF treaty, 134 CoNo. REC.
S6937 (daily ed. May 27, 1988), an attempt by the Senate to set forth a "Rule of Decision" for
treaties, is an interesting example of the legislative branch directing the Executive's interpretation of
a treaty. The Biden Amendment's constitutionality has been questioned, but the issue has not been
litigated, and probably cannot be, since no individual is likely to have standing to contest the inter-
pretation of a Ballistic Missile treaty. But cf United States v. Stuart, 109 S. Ct. 1183, 1196-98 (1989)
(concurring in the judgment), where Justice Scalia suggested that the Biden Condition was unconsti-
tutional. See infra text accompanying notes 48-51. For views of the Biden Condition, see generally
Symposium, Arms Control Treaty Reinterpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1351 (1989), especially the
contributions of Abraham Sofaer, Treaty Interpretation: A Comment, in id. at 1437, and that of
JUSTICE SCALIA v CONGRESS
stitutional scheme,31 should not acquiesce to this kind of power play.
Instead, as Justice Scalia argues, courts should read the statutes passed
by Congress as the only congressional actions that have any effect on the
outside world:
Respondents press upon us an excerpt from the House Committee Re-
port pertaining to the 1985 reenactment .... If this language is to be
controlling upon us, it must be either (1) an authoritative interpreta-
tion of what the 1980 statute meant, or (2) an authoritative interpreta-
tion of what the 1985 Congress intended. It cannot, of course, be the
former, since it is the function of the courts and not the Legislature,
much less a Committee of one House of the Legislature, to say what an
enacted statute means. Nor can it reasonably be thought to be the
latter-because it is not an explanation of any language that the 1985
Committee drafted, because on its face it accepts the 1980 meaning of
the terms as subsisting, and because there is nothing whatever in the
text or even the legislative history of the 1985 reenactment that Con-
gress thought it was doing anything insofar as the present issue is con-
cerned, except reenacting and making permanent the 1980
legislation.32
Justice Scalia relates prudential (and constitutional or governmen-
tal) concerns to his theory of statutory interpretation: The Supreme
Court should encourage the coordinate branches to function as pre-
scribed by the Constitution. Since the Constitution mandates that the
legislature express its intent through laws, not through committee re-
ports, 33 then giving any weight to pronouncements from reports will en-
courage "undemocratic" behavior, and reduce governmental
accountability to the citizens. To discourage reliance on reports, Justice
Senator Joseph Biden and John Ritch, The Treaty Power: Upholding a Constitutional Partnership, in
id. at 1529.
31. This is the view of the Office of Legal Policy: "There is a widely held view that judges must
decide statutory cases by determining how the original legislature would have wanted the statute to
be applied .... This view represents an abdication of the proper judicial role in deciding a statutory
case or controversy .... " OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, USING AND MISUS-
ING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 40-41 (1989).
Justice Scalia has conceded the lack of textual support in the Constitution for the concept of
separation of powers: "[The principle of separation of powers is found only in the structure of the
[Constitution,] which successively describes where the legislative, executive, and judicial powers
shall'reside. One should not think, however, that the principle was any less important to the federal
framers." Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 881 (1983) (footnote omitted).
32. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566-67 (1988) (majority). Interestingly, this case in-
volved the 1985 amendments to the Equal Access to Justice Act, the same provision in dispute in
Hirschey v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See supra notes 9-10
and accompanying text. This argument presumes that the legislative history of a re-enactment has
less importance than that of the original enactment.
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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Scalia believes the Court should refuse to consider the extra-legislative
statements in interpreting statutes.3 4
C. Legislative History in the Interpretation of Very Old Statutes
A large portion of the Supreme Court's caseload consists of inter-
preting extremely old statutes. For example, the Civil Rights Act of
1870 and the Sherman Act, both over a hundred years old, continue to
generate substantial litigation. Some Justices and commentators have
suggested that it may be especially important to examine legislative his-
tory when dealing with a very old statute because words are more likely
to have changed in meaning with the passage of time.3 5
Justice Scalia presented his theory of interpreting old statutes in K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,36 a case involving the 1930 Tariff Act.3 7
Again, he maintained the Court should have interpreted the language
Congress used, not tried to determine what Congress meant:
The principle of our democratic system is not that each legislature en-
acts a purpose, independent of the language in a statute, which the
courts must perpetuate, assuring that it is fully achieved but never
overshot by expanding or ignoring the statutory language as changing
circumstances require. To the contrary, it seems to me the prerogative
of each currently elected Congress to allow those laws which change
has rendered nugatory to die.., and to allow those laws whose effects
have been expanded by change to remain alive if it favors the new
effects.38
Thus, Justice Scalia does not regard legislative history as a necessary con-
sideration, even when the statute clearly has changed meaning over the
years. What matters is not what the authors of the statute intended but
rather what the current Congress probably believes the statute to mean,
34. In Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (concurring in the judgment),
Justice Scalia remarked:
One must wonder, however, whether the good produced by a judicial rule that accommo-
dates this remote possibility is outweighed by its adverse effects. An enactment by implica-
tion cannot realistically be regarded as the product of the difficult lawmaking process our
Constitution has prescribed. Committee reports, floor speeches, and even colloquies be-
tween Congressmen... are frail substitutes for bicameral vote upon the text of a law and
its presentment to the President.
Id. at 191-92. For further discussion of these arguments, see Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory
Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. Rv. 1007, 1076-79 (1989).
35. See, eg., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-83 (1961) (Douglas, J., majority) (extensive
examination of legislative history of § 1983); Ziegler, A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine in
Light of the Legislative History of Reconstruction, 1983 DUKE L.J. 987, 990-91 (same).
36. 486 U.S. 281, 323-25 (1988) (concurring in part, dissenting in part).
37. TariffAct of 1930, Pub. L. No. 46-361, 46 Stat. 590, 741 (codified at amended at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1526 (1988)).
38. K Mart, 486 U.S. at 325.
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when it decides not to repeal or revise them. 39 For Justice Scalia,
originalism is always inappropriate in interpreting statutes.
D. Legislative History in Treaty Interpretation
Treaties present a special obstacle to a Justice who hopes to divine
the intent of a document's creator. Whose intent matters? A treaty has
multiple legislative histories: the histories developed by the signatories to
the treaty and the history accompanying Senate ratification. 4° For Jus-
tice Scalia, the possibility of multiple histories is another reason to avoid
legislative history altogether.
Justice Scalia found reason to avoid consultation of the legislative
history of a treaty in his first Supreme Court decision, O'Connor v.
United States, in which he ruled in favor of the government's interpreta-
tion of a treaty affecting U.S. income taxation. 41 In explaining the
Court's decision, Justice Scalia stated: "While the Claims Court may
have been correct that the negotiating history does not favor the Govern-
ment's position sufficiently to overcome what that court regarded as a
plain textual meaning in favor of the taxpayers, it certainly does not
favor the taxpayers' position sufficiently to affect our view of the text."42
Scalia expounded his views on the value of using treaty history at
greater length in Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., a case arising from the
1983 destruction of a Korean Air Lines aircraft by a Soviet missile.4 3
The airline sought to invoke a provision in the Warsaw Convention (as
modified by a later treaty) that limited its liability to $75,000 per passen-
ger. The airline had printed the liability limitation on tickets in eight-
point type, significantly smaller than the ten-point type required by the
treaty. The issue for the Court was whether this violation invalidated the
liability limitation. Liability depended on which of two facially inconsis-
tent passages of the treaty were to be given force. Justice Scalia refused
to examine the treaty's history, dismissing the Solicitor General's and the
Petitioners' attempts by noting that they "seek to explain the variance
between Section I and Sections II and III (as well as the clear text of
Article 3) as a drafting error, and lead us through the labyrinth of the
Convention's drafting history in an effort to establish this point.""4 Jus-
39. This approach makes the circular assumption that the current Congress decided not to
repeal or revise on the basis of what it read in the words of the statute, not on the basis of the
statute's meaning at the time it was written.
40. If the other nation signing the treaty also created a legislative history, there conceivably
could be a third source.
41. O'Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27 (1986) (majority).
42. Id. at 35.
43. 109 S. Ct. 1676 (1989) (majority).
44. Id. at 1683.
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tice Scalia refuted the petitioners' argument by constructing a concededly
hypothetical alternative treaty purpose, which proved that the treaty as
written might not have been irrational. The hypothetical legislative in-
tent leads to an outcome inconsistent with the legislative history, so Jus-
tice Scalia ignores the legislative history, in favor of "the text."
Unsurprisingly, the opinion finds the text sufficiently clear to conclude
there should be no penalty against the airline.
Justice Scalia's harshest words on the use of treaty history appear in
his concurring opinion in United States v. Stuart. 45 The issue in that
case was whether a tax treaty with Canada allowed the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) to supply information to the Canadian tax authority even
though that agency was commencing a criminal investigation. This
presented a problem because the IRS is forbidden by statute from issuing
a summons to further a criminal investigation of a United States tax-
payer.46 Justice Brennan's majority opinion held that the treaty's plain
language allowed information disclosure, and the legislative history de-
veloped in the United States Senate ratification hearings of the treaty
corroborated this understanding. Although Justice Scalia agreed with
the Court's conclusion, he took exception to its reliance, even for corrob-
oration, on the Senate legislative history. Asserting first that "[tihe use
of such materials is unprecedented," Justice Scalia then explains why
those materials should not be consulted: "Using preratification Senate
materials ... is rather like determining the meaning of a bilateral con-
tract between two corporations on the basis of what the Board of Direc-
tors of one of them thought it meant when authorizing the Chief
Executive Officer to conclude it."'47 He further noted that the Supreme
Court previously refused to give effect to explicit conditions of ratifica-
tion of a treaty, and in Scalia's view conditions or stipulations in a com-
mittee report should receive no more respect than resolutions passed by
the full Senate.
At the end of the concurrence, Justice Scalia explains his concern is
not so much with the case at hand (where, after all, he concurs in the
45. 109 S. Ct. 1183, 1193 (1989).
46. 26 U.S.C. § 7602(c) (1988).
47. Stuart, 109 S. Ct. at 1195. Justice Brennan replies:
[Tihe better comparison is to a meeting of the Board whose minutes and position papers
the other corporation's Board and Chief Executive Officer are invited to peruse. It is horn-
book contract law that the proper construction of an agreement is that given by one of the
parties when "that party had no reason to know of any different meaning attached by the
other, and the other had reason to know the meaning attached by the first party."
Id. at 1192 n.7 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(2)(b) (1981)). Justice
Brennan also might have noted that in Texaco v. Pennzoil, 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 994 (1988), the deliberations of the board of directors of one corporation were
considered to be relevant in determining whether a contract had been formed. Id. at 791.
[Vol. 1990:160
JUSTICE SCALIA v CONGRESS
judgment) as with unrelated issues pending in other arenas. In particu-
lar, he names a then-pending controversy over the Senate's interpretation
of the Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty48 (ABM treaty), and two cases re-
cently decided by the District Court for the District of Columbia.49
These controversies all hinged on whether the Executive branch may be
bound to the interpretation of a treaty that it expounded in ratification
hearings before the Senate. Justice Scalia then goes far out of his way to
issue an advisory opinion to the administration on how he would rule on
this issue:
[T]he Government conceded that "authoritative Executive branch rep-
resentations concerning the meaning of a Treaty which form part of
the basis upon which the Senate gives advice and consent are entitled
to be accorded binding weight as a matter of domestic constitutional
law, and the Executive branch fully accepts that it is bound by such
statements." It is not clear that this latest position taken by the Gov-
ernment in the District Court is correct, or would even be the position
taken by the Solicitor General.5 0
Thus, Justice Scalia announced, somewhat gratuitously, that in his view
the Executive Branch is not bound by any aspect of the legislative history
of a treaty, not even the part that it contributed. This passage clearly is
addressed to a "Case... or controversy" not before the Court, and reads
suspiciously like an advisory opinion, which the Supreme Court is ex-
pressly forbidden from given.51 Justice Scalia apparently either decided
he could not wait until the controversy about the ABM Treaty reached
the Supreme Court, or feared that the treaty was by its nature nonjusti-
ciable and thus would never reach his chambers. In any event, Justice
Scalia could not resist the temptation to make known his views.
E. In Favor of Legislative History
Despite Justice Scalia's arguments, courts have many compelling
reasons to analyze legislative history. First of all, since the statutes under
48. Stuart, 109 S. Ct. at 1196-97 (citing Washington Post, Feb. 6, Feb. 17, and March 19,
1988).
49. Id. (citing Rainbow Navigation, Inc. v. Department of Navy, 699 F. Supp. 339 (D.D.C.
1988), and Rainbow Navigation, Inc. v. Department of Navy, 686 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1988)).
Justice Scalia had ruled on another aspect of the same dispute prior to his appointment to the
Supreme Court. Rainbow Navigation, Inc. v. Department of Navy, 783 F.2d 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
50. Id. at 1197 (citation omitted).
51. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
As Justice Scalia has noted in another context
[G]iving a court authority to take action directed, not to the resolution of the dispute
before it, but to the generation and management of other disputes, is, if not unconstitu-
tional, at least so out of accord with age-old practices that surely it should not be assumed
unless it has been clearly conferred.
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 110 S. Ct. 482, 489 (1989) (dissenting).
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interpretation are enacted by Congress, Congress is the obvious place to
turn to determine what, if anything, the statutory words mean.52 Justice
Scalia has proposed that courts ignore Congress's own explanation of the
words it has chosen in favor of more general definitional sources, such as
a dictionary or a thesaurus.5 3 Yet such sources will shed light on con-
gressional intent only if Congress anticipated the question and relied on
the same source as the courts.
More significantly, Justice Scalia's discussions frequently suggest
that the Court often faces a choice between relying on legislative history
or commonly accepted principles of adjudication. However, the choice
before the Court could be described, equally accurately, as between fol-
lowing the congressional judgment on a particular issue or following
some other standard in making a decision. Relying on an adminstrative
agency's interpretation-an approach Justice Scalia favors 54 -is no more
"neutral" than reliance on legislative history. And to the extent agency
interpretation replaces the judgment of elected officials with the judg-
ment of civil servants, it is less democratic. Further, the creation of legis-
lative history is sanctioned by the Constitution 55 whereas decisionmaking
through an administrative process is not.5 6
A judge committed to avoiding legislative history frequently must
rely on other abstract principles to decide a case. Justice Scalia fre-
quently uses a pragmatic principle: He eliminates possible interpreta-
tions based on what a particular word "cannot rationally ... mean."' 57
But obviously, this type of judgment substitutes the legislative meaning
52. Stanley Fish has argued that all statutes are inherently ambiguous, because words have no
meaning outside of the interpretative community where they were created. See S. FISH, DOING
WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE IN LITERARY AND LEGAL
STUDIES 123 (1988) ("[R]ules, in law or anywhere else, do not stand in an independent relationship
to a field of action on which they can simply be imposed . . . ."). Without taking this extreme
position, it is unarguable that a statute of general application, no matter how carefully drafted, will
give rise to some ambiguities when interpreted in a new context.
53. In John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 110 S. Ct. 471, 479 (1989) (dissenting), the thesau-
rus consulted by Justice Scalia led to the opposite conclusion of the dictionary consulted by Justice
Blackmun. Compare id. at 480 with id. at 476 (Blackmun, J., majority). A definition from legisla-
tive history presumably could have settled the dispute in the way that Congress intended; Justice
Blackmun at least noted that there was no helpful legislative history on the issue in question.
54. Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretation of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511.
55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 ("Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings and from
time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy....").
56. See generally P. STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES 12 (1989) ("[T]he Constitution... does not define the government itself. That is to
say, it does not define the bureaucracy, the specialist institutions that carry out the specific tasks of
public affairs.").
57. Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 109 S. Ct. 1981, 1994 (1989) (concurring in the
judgment). Three dissenting Supreme Court justices, however, found a version of the "irrational"
meaning the proper one.
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with one created by an unelected judge whose constitutional role is lim-
ited to deciding cases, not rewriting laws to fit his own sense of rational-
ity.s8 From the point of view of fidelity to either the Constitution or the
principle of democracy, then, reliance on legislative history is superior to
reliance on other sources.
Justice Scalia's prudential reasons for avoiding legislative history are
no more convincing. It may be true that the Court should not encourage
Congress to circumvent the legislative process by passing vague laws and
then relying on precise legislative history to direct the Executive Branch
enforcing the laws. However, Professors Glicksman and Shapiro have
argued that Executive refusal to follow clearly expressed congressional
intent in legislative histories forces Congress to make the opposite mis-
take: to legislate with too much detail.59 For example, the perceived
need to legislate with too much specificity in the environmental field 6"
has forced Congress to make scientific judgments, relying to a greater
extent on its staff in areas in which it often lacks expertise. Because Con-
gress almost always acts prospectively, it is poorly equipped to allow ex-
ceptions to statutes of general application, even where a fundamental
sense of justice might require an exception. A Member of Congress
might be more comfortable explaining her intent in a committee report
rather than writing a more specific bill if she reasonably believed the in-
terpreters of the statute would look to the committee report for guidance,
and follow it, absent some unforeseeable but compelling reason to act
otherwise.61
Senator Biden has asserted that a long-standing, negotiated balance
of power between the Executive and Legislative branches makes less for-
mal communications, such as Senate reports, especially crucial in the
area of Senate influence over foreign policy 62 and treaty interpretation.63
Because foreign policy actions frequently require greater statutory dele-
gations to the Executive Branch (otherwise, the President would be un-
able to react to rapidly changing events, or to negotiate treaties) the
Senate has in the past coupled delegation with various mechanisms for
58. In other contexts, Justice Scalia generally espouses a narrow role for the Judiciary. See
e.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 332-42 (1988) (dissenting) (advocating narrower understanding of
judicial "case or controversy"); Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., v. Sperling, 110 S. Ct. 482, 488 (1989)
(arguing that courts have limited power to notify potential plaintiffs of claims).
59. Shapiro & Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Quiet Revolution in Adminis-
trative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819, 840-42.
60. This need grew from a perception that the Environmental Protection Agency was refusing
to perform its congressionally mandated role in promulgating regulations. Id. at 825-28.
61. Judge Scalia explicitly rebuffed an attempt to do this in Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751
F.2d 1336, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (majority).
62. Biden, Who Needs the Legislative Veto?, 35 SYRAcusE L. REv. 685, 693-701 (1984).
63. Biden & Ritch, supra note 30, at 1533-36.
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continuous oversight, not through additional statutes but through resolu-
tions, committee investigations, and committee reports. Since the
Supreme Court declared the legislative veto unconstitutional in Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 64 such mechanisms have little
binding force. Senator Biden claims that President Reagan's decision to
ignore a joint resolution requesting withdrawal of troops from Lebanon
led to the loss of American lives.65 By similar reasoning, allowing the
Executive to ignore representations it made to Congress when it inter-
prets treaties would "threaten[ ] paralysis ... since the Senate's only
recourse would be to attach elaborate and numerous conditions to trea-
ties in order to ensure that its understanding became an integral and ex-
plicit part of a treaty's ratification documents. '66
The recurrent argument that legislative history is created by non-
legislators and therefore inadmissible, is completely fallacious. All three
branches of government commonly delegate the job of drafting written
material to staff members. A Member of Congress may not have read the
legislation she is voting, any more than she read the legislative history;
this fact does not reduce the importance of either document to the na-
tion.67 Moreover, the fact that a judicial clerk rather than a duly con-
firmed article III judge wrote a particular opinion does not make it less
binding on lower courts. Similarly, if the President accepts without res-
ervation an aide's or an astrologer's recommendation that a bill be ve-
toed, and even signs ihe veto message proposed by the aide without
reading it, the veto still would have legal force.68 What should count is
not who operates the word processor, but whether the proper elected
official accepts responsibility for the words, according to proper
procedures.
Finally, it is not the case that a Member of Congress may slip au-
thoritative comments favoring special interest groups into legislative his-
64. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Significantly, Justice Scalia had long argued that the
legislative veto was unconstitutional. Scalia, The Legislative Veto: A False Remedy for System Over-
load, REGULATION, Nov./Dec. 1979, at 3- 1976 Bicentennial Institute-Oversight and Review of
Agency Decisionmaking, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 69, 685-89 (1976) (remarks of Assistant Attorney
General Antonin Scalia).
65. Biden, supra note 72, at 700 (citing H.R. 2915, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1013 (1983) (urging
troop withdrawals), and H.R. CONF. REP. 563, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (same).
66. Biden, supra note 30, at 1539.
67. Anyone who has read both will admit, however, that committee reports are much more
accessible than statutory language to the average reader. Because of that committee reports may be
more likely to be read, by Members of Congress as well as by the general public.
68. Thus, the fact that President Reagan chose the moment for announcing his choice of Justice
Kennedy's appointment on the basis of his astrologer's unreviewed recommendation did not render
the appointment invalid, even though the Constitution grants responsibility for judicial nominations
to the President and not the astrologer. See J. QUIGLEY, "WHAT DID JOAN SAY?" MY SEVEN
YEARS AS WHITE HOUSE ASTROLOGER TO NANCY AND RONALD REAGAN 170-71 (1990).
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tory that otherwise would not have been acceptable to the legislature as a
whole. Both the House and the Senate have rules governing the produc-
tion of committee reports, mandating both the contents of a legislative
history and the means by which it is produced. 69 These rules require that
committee records be kept openly and contain an adequate explanation
of the congressional action under consideration, including cost estimates,
regulatory impact analysis, and other specific topics.70 Members of the
committees have an opportunity to publish concurring or dissenting
views.71 Indeed, minority staff and staff of committee members closely
monitor the writing process, and tell their boss either to object to an
offending provision contrary to the will of the committee, or to fie views
to the report, signalling the controversy to other Members. Thus, an
uncontradicted statement in a legislative history could not appear unless
no other committee member of the committee believed it was important
to contradict that statement. Further, the reports must be available to
the full House and Senate, and any Member of Congress is free to raise
questions on the floor with respect to the committee report, or to vote
against a piece of legislation because she disagrees with the committee
report, whether or not she supports the text of the proposed legislation.
In other words, the congressional review of legislative history is not very
different from the congressional review of legislation.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
A. Is the Constitution Different?
At least since the time of Chief Justice Marshall,72 Supreme Court
Justices and legal commentators frequently have argued that the rules for
understanding and interpreting the Constitution differ from the rules for
interpreting a statute. Because the words of the Constitution are gener-
ally immutable and the Constitution was created at a unique moment in
American history, it should be treated differently from statutes regularly
enacted at the will of Congress. For example, a court can fashion a rem-
edy for violations of the Constitution, even in the absence of any explicit
69. Senate Manual Containing the Standing Rules, Laws, and Resolutions Affecting the Business
of the United States Senate, S. Doc. No. 100-1 (1988), Standing Rule 26.10-11; Constitution, Jeffer-
son's Manual andRules ofthe House ofRepresentatives, H.R. Doc. No. 100-218 (1988), Rule 11, cl.
2. For explanation of how Congress actually produces legislative history, see Costello, supra note
10.
70. Senate Standing Rule 26.1 la-b; House Rule 11, cl. 2, § 713e.
71. Senate Rule 26.10c; House Rule 11, cl. 2, § 714.
72. McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) ("We must never forget, that
it is a Constitution we are interpreting.").
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grant of private remedy. 73 On the other hand, Supreme Court opinions
interpreting the Constitution should be accorded less stare decisis weight
because they cannot be undone by the legislature if erroneous. 74 Finally,
the Framers of the Constitution are more distant from us in both time
and worldview, and their concerns are more alien to us, than the under-
standings of the authors of virtually all statutes. Whether the original,
historical meaning of the Constitution, as evidenced by views the Fram-
ers expressed outside of the text of the Constitution itself, should be con-
sulted is a controversial issue.75
Justice Scalia, however, has rejected in one sense the notion that the
Constitution is inherently different from a statute:
[T]he Constitution, though it has an effect superior to other laws, is in
its nature the sort of "law" that is the business of the courts-an enact-
ment that has a fixed meaning ascertainable through the usual devices
familiar to those learned in law. 76
So, regardless of the reasons for considering the Constitution differently,
for Justice Scalia it is in the end simply a document for a court to
interpret.77
Justice Scalia's interpretive belief affects his constitutional rulings.
For example, he held that where a statute precluded legal challenge to an
73. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Officers, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See generally E. CHEMERIN.
SKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 451-70 (1988) (summarizing current case law).
74. Justice Scalia endorses this view in Gathers v. South Carolina, 109 S. Ct. 2207, 2218 (1989)
(dissenting).
75. The Office of Legal Policy has asserted:
In fact, the justifications for looking beyond the text are even weaker for statutes than for
the Constitution. First, most statutes that are the subject of litigation are of relatively
recent origin, and the original meaning of their language is the same as the contemporary
meaning. Second, the legal rules in statutes are usually spelled out in greater detail than
those in the Constitution. Third, the Constitution specifies rules for the enactment of stat-
utes that imply severe limits on the use of legislative history, but since these rules are
obviously inapplicable to the Constitution itself, they are not directly relevant to constitu-
tional interpretation.
OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 31, at 26 n.97. A complete refutation of this view is beyond
the scope of this Note. However, the first justification is out of step with Justice Scalia's view of the
interpretation of old statutes, see supra text accompanying notes 35-38, and the second directly
contradicts the Office of Legal Counsel's view that legislative history should not be used to fill gaps.
Id at 97-104. Finally, the Constitution also specifies rules for its own ratification, which on their
own terms appear to preclude the consultation of secondary sources for constitutional interpretation.
See infra text accompanying notes 89-92.
76. Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 852 (1989). Curiously,
though, the "usual devices" Justice Scalia lists in the passages that follow include examination of
"legislative history," and similar sources, which he precludes from consideration in statutory
decisions.
77. In light of Justice Scalia's views of statutory interpretation, one might expect that "the
usual devices" to which he refers include careful examination of the text, perhaps aided by a diction-
ary. But this turns out not to be the case. See, eg., id. at 859 (citing THE FEDERALIST PAPERS,
BLACKsTONE'S COMMENTARIES, and the Debates at the North Carolina State Ratifying
Convention).
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agency's decision, it should be interpreted to preclude challenge on con-
stitutional as well as statutory grounds:
The only respect in which a constitutional claim is necessarily more
significant than any other kind of claim is that ... it can be asserted
against the legislature itself, whereas a nonconstitutional claim... can-
not. That is an important distinction.... But it has no relevance to
the question whether, as between executive violations of statutes and
executive violations of the Constitution-both of which are equally un-
lawful, and neither of which can be said, a priori, to be more harmful
or more unfair to the plaintiff-one or the other category should be
favored by a presumption against exclusion of judicial review. 78
The special concerns about violations of constitutional rights that moti-
vated Chief Justice John Marshall in McCullough carry no weight
against the asserted right of Congress to limit the judiciary's jurisdiction
in any way that it chooses (even though the jurisdictional limitation is far
from clear).
Thus, if a statute and the Constitution do not conflict, Justice Scalia
would interpret both according to the same rules. Based on the rules he
uses for interpreting statutes, then, one would expect that Justice Scalia
would rely on the text of the Constitution as the sole source of its
meaning.
These expectations, however, would be disappointed. Justice
Scalia's views on constitutional interpretation, unlike his position on stat-
utory interpretation, resemble the views of other conservative judges. He
is an originalist who seeks to interpret the Constitution as the Framers
would have understood it.79 This view is not absolute-for example, Jus-
tice Scalia does not advocate overturning longstanding precedents sim-
ply because they do not accord with some of the founders' beliefs on a
particular issue.80 However, Justice Scalia's outlook informs his beliefs
and decisions in most areas.8 ' Where precedent has deviated in a sub-
stantial way from original intent, it should have limited application in
78. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 618 (1988) (dissenting).
In this case, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion reinstated a wrongful discharge action
by a CIA employee who had been fired because of his homosexuality. The plaintiffhad argued that
this action violated the fourteenth amendment. The majority's opinion argued that the statute for-
bidding challenges to CIA employment decisions was inapplicable to a constitutional challenge. Be-
cause the decision reversed a district court's dismissal, the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of
the claim.
79. Scalia, supra note 76, at 852. Compare this position to that taken in Confirmation Hear-
ings, supra note 7, at 48-49, where Justice Scalia refused to be pinned down to an originalist position,
but conceded that he was "more inclined to the original meaning than... to a phrase like 'living
Constitution.'"
80. Scalia's favorite example of this is the possibility that a historian might discover that Mar-
bury was incorrectly decided. Scalia, supra note 76, at 861.
81. This view is less strict with regard to some parts of the Bill of Rights. See, eg., Jones v.
Thomas, 109 S. Ct. 2522, 2529 (1989) (dissenting) (double jeopardy); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S.
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future cases: this precedent is "suspect" if the Court has an opportunity
to reconsider the area.82 Justice Scalia uses a variety of sources to deter-
mine "original intent," principally the Records of the Constitutional
Convention, the Federalist Papers, pre-Constitutional case law, and Sa-
muel Johnson's Dictionary. Even sources not composed by the Framers
are introduced in order to provide evidence of what they believed words
or constitutional clauses to mean.83
B. The Problems with Constitutional History
The problems of the unreliability of the record of the constitutional
"legislative history"8 4 are greater than they are with recently enacted
statues. After all, the Convention did not publish a record of proceed-
ings, and most of the currently available record was created from James
Madison's notes, which were not published until 1840, and have long
been considered to be of uncertain accuracy.8 5 There is little evidence
that the Framers expected courts to use their notes and debates as guides
to legal interpretation. 86
In some respects, the Constitution also may be understood as a
treaty between separate sovereign states. The individual states ratified
868 (1987) (majority) (probable cause); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987) (majority) (con-
frontation clause); Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987) (majority) (same).
82. Scalia, supra note 76, at 854.
83. See infra notes 84 and 89.
84. Justice Scalia relies on Farrand's NOTES FROM THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION in
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 341 (1988) (dissenting) (meaning of "Case or controversy"); and Sun
Oil Company v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (majority) (full faith and credit clause); and
Morgan v. United States, 801 F.2d 445, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (majority) (art. I, § 5, cl. 1, which
states: "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its
Members.").
In another group of cases, he casts a wider net, using a variety of secondary sources to deter-
mine the common meaning of language used in the Constitution. Brower v. County of Inyo, 109 S.
Ct. 1378 (1989) (majority) (analysis of 1760's Writs of Assistance Case to determine meaning of
"Search and Seizure"); Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 679 (1989) (dissenting) (Locke's
SECOND TREATISE on importance of separation of powers); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1014-19
(1988) (majority) (New Testament and Shakespeare used to explicate Confrontation Clause); Morri-
son v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 719 (dissenting) (Johnson's dictionary on meaning of constitutional term
"inferior").
85. See generally Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary
Record, 65 TEx. L. REv. 1, 24-33 (1986). Hutson argues that Madison's published notes are an
accurate rendition of what he transcribed in 1787, but "they are far from a verbatim account of what
was said in the Convention." Id. at 35. Less complete versions of the Records of the Constitutional
Convention were published as early as 1819. Id. at 2, 6-12.
86. Cf Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 99 HARV. L. REV 885, 887
(1985). For a strident but unconvincing opposing argument, see Berger, The Founders' Views-
According to Jefferson Powell, 67 Tax. L. REv. 1033 (1989).
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the document in the same manner that nations would ratify a treaty.8 7
As a result of the common requirement of ratification, many of the justi-
fications for ignoring the legislative history of treaties also apply to con-
stitutional materials. The state ratifying conventions created separate
"legislative histories" from the national Convention. And since nine
state ratifications were necessary before the Constitution would have
legal effect,88 Justice Scalia's reasons for rejecting the legislative history
of treaties should apply with greater force to the Constitution.
Justice Scalia's occasional reliance on The Federalist Papers 89 is es-
pecially ironic because they were not written or published until after the
Constitution had taken effect.90 Those writings were intended to influ-
ence the New York Ratification, Convention, but since New York was
the tenth state to ratify, its ratification had no legal effect.91 Thus, the
Federalist Papers resemble the after-the-fact legislative history Justice
Scalia excoriated in Hirschey and Pierce v. Underwood. 92 Another prob-
lem affecting both the Federalist Papers and all other contemporaneous
87. The Articles of Confederation "created not a national government, in any modem sense,
but 'a firm league of friendship."' Kay, The Illegality of the Constitution, 4 CONsT. COMMENTARY
57, 62 (1986) (citing ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II). The states were not simply approving
a resolution in conformance with their powers under the Articles of Confederation. Id. at 67-70.
88. U.S. CONsT. art. VII.
89. See, eg., Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington Dep't of Revenues, 483 U.S. 232, 264 (1987)
(concurring in part and dissenting in part) (meaning of Commerce Clause); Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (dissenting) (separation of powers); Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et
Fils, 481 U.S. 787, 824 (1987) (concurring) (same); Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 682
(1989) (dissenting) (same).
Inexplicably, he also turns to The Federalist Papers in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson & Co.,
109 S. Ct. 709, 735 (1989) (concurring), a case where the only relevant constitutional provision was
the fourteenth amendment. Justice Scalia approvingly quotes Madison's view that in a smaller
rather than a larger community, the majority will be more likely to be able to oppress those who
disagree with it. This argument is uncharacteristically sloppy. First, Madison's views on the dan-
gers of oppression of a minority referred to individuals who differed in political, not racial character-
istics. Since Scalia has argued that the discrimination here is especially invidious because it is racial,
Madison has nothing to say. More importantly, though, Madison's theory of federalism, and of the
balancing of local, state, and federal interests, is completely irrelevant. If Madison was advocating
granting the federal judiciary power to review local governmental decisions, his view was not incor-
porated into the final Constitution. All of the arguments presented in Croson concern the fourteenth
amendment, enacted in 1870, and without the benefit of Madison's draftsmanship. Since Scalia does
not (and cannot) argue that the fourteenth amendment was part of a plan to fulfill Madison's vision
of the federal government in the states, the quotation has no persuasive power in relation to the issue
the Court faces.
90. See U.S. CONST. art. VII (Constitution becomes effective upon ratification by nine states).
91. Of course, the ratifications by the final four states had tremendouspractical effects. If New
York had not approved of the Constitution, the United States might well have fallen apart. It would
be very surprising if any New York court would accept the Constitution as legally binding, if that
state had not ratified it. However, Justice Scalia applies formalistic standards to the use of legislative
history in statutory contexts; if we consider the Constitution to be a statute, its interpretative materi-
als should receive the same treatment.
92. See supra text accompanying note 32.
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constitutional records is that they were unavailable to almost all of the
states ratifying the Constitution, since they were published late in the
ratifying process. In this respect, they resemble the legislative history
associated with a treaty that Justice Scalia abhors using.93
Finally, the Federalist Papers arguably are more comparable to let-
ters by a Congressman to his constituents than to committee reports.
Garry Wills has argued persuasively that Madison occasionally misrepre-
sented the Constitution to make it appear less threatening to its oppo-
nents or closer to Madison's preferred form of government. 94
The most venerable argument opposing attempts to ascertain the
Framers' intent is that they were aware they were writing a document
that would last a very long time, and they intentionally chose language
that could be interpreted flexibly.95 A related argument is that the Fram-
ers did not expect their documentary records to be consulted, thus to do
so violates their intention.96 The fact that the Framers made no attempt
to publish the Conventions records until much later and published the
Federalist Papers anonymously contrasts with the practices of contempo-
rary legislators, who require themselves to distribute publicly complete
legislative histories to the general public, generally within seven working
days.97
IV. EFFECT OF JUSTICE SCALIA'S RULES FOR BALANCE OF POWER
By now, it should be clear that Justice Scalia's originalism depends
heavily on secondary sources to interpret the Constitution's provisions,
but he ignores both secondary sources and congressional intent in inter-
preting statutes. The inconsistency is most apparent in the cases discuss-
ing separation of powers, where Justice Scalia cannot be a textualist
since he has no text. In other words, the text of Justice Scalia's Constitu-
tion is larger than the official text in the United States Code-it incorpo-
rates the Federalist Papers and the Documentary History of the
Constitutional Convention, among other documents-whereas his book
of statutes is precisely the same size.
Why this inconsistency? Curiously, the originalist approach to con-
stitutional decisions has the same effect on the balance of powers as the
93. See supra text accompanying notes 42-51.
94. See G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 169-75, 267 (1981); see also
Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REv. 659, 687 (1987) (noting that the questions on the
Federalists' sincerity limits their utility as legislative history).
95. See, eg., Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 63 (1955).
96. Powell, supra note 86, at 887.
97. See generally Hutson, supra note 85, at 2; Senate Standing Rule 26.10b (seven working
days); House Rule XI, cl. 2, § 713b (same).
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textualist approach to statutory decisions, 98 at least in terms of the power
of the legislature. In the simplest formulation, both rules reduce the leg-
islature's power.
A. The Separation of Powers Decisions
Justice Scalia's views on the respective rights and powers of different
branches of the government are forcefully stated, controversial, and may
be the area of his greatest intellectual contribution. This Note analyses
those decisions because they reveal Justice Scalia's method and the polit-
ical conclusions that follow from his decision to consult secondary
sources in constitutional interpretation.99
If the Constitution is the same as a statute, as Justice Scalia suggests,
then determining that a legislative enactment is unconstitutional based
on "separation of powers" is problematic because neither the words nor
concept of judicial review of legislation for separation of powers
problems appear anywhere in the text of the Constitution. 100 The Con-
stitution defines three separate duties: the Legislative, the Executive, and
the Judicial. In some areas, the enumerated powers of the three branches
overlap. 101
To Justice Scalia, the fact that there is no specific mention of separa-
tion of powers in the Constitution does not signify there is no basis for
judicial decisions on issues involving separation of powers.10 2 Instead, he
believes that the Supreme Court has a duty to police the balance of pow-
98. Cf Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 430
n.91 (1989) ("The combination of textualism, disregard of legislative history, and the Chevron prin-
ciple.., would produce a dramatic increase in the executive's power to make law.").
99. For a list of Justice Scalia's cases analyzing secondary constitutional source, see supra notes
84 and 89.
100. See Scalia, supra note 31, at 881 ("[W]ith an economy of expression that many would urge
as a model for modem judicial opinions, the principle of separation of powers is found only in the
structure of the [Constitution.]").
101. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (granting legislature the power "to raise and sup-
port armies") with id. art. II, § 2 ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy"). The power to make binding treaties and to place Justices and other officials in office are, of
course, joint responsibilities of the Executive and the legislative branches.
102. In Morrison v. Olso, Scalia noted that the Massachusetts Constitution contains explicit
rules on separation of powers. Professor Casper has found that the Constitution did consider adopt-
ing a similar measure for the United States Constitution, but did not. Casper, An Essay in Separation
of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 WM & MARY L. REv. 211, 221 (1989). In a
statutory context, Scalia might have assumed that leaving a provision out precluded the judiciary
from using its terms to decide cases. Cf Confirmation Hearings, supra note 9, at 75, where Senator
Heflin quoted an earlier speech by Justice Scalia where he stated that the strongest form of legislative
history is the case where a particular provision appeared on a draft and was later dropped by the full
legislature.
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ers among the three branches in order to preserve the liberties of all
Americans.10 3
But without any textual clues, how can the judiciary decide when a
law or action violates separation of powers? The Supreme Court's body
of precedent is rarely much help, since there were few cases on these
issues before the 1970s.10 4 The only textual clues are the three talismanic
phrases: Legislative power, Executive power, and Judicial power. Con-
sulting a dictionary-either a modem one or one in use in the 1780s1°5-
for insight into these terms is unlikely to answer the issue. A review of
prominent recent separation of powers cases illustrates how Justice Scalia
fashions an answer to this issue.
1. Synar. Justice Scalia's first major ruling on separation of pow-
ers decision was the per curiam decision in Synar v. United States, 106 in
which a three-judge panel (including Judge Scalia) held the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act'0 7 included an unconstitutional delegation of ex-
ecutive powers to a legislative officer.10 8 As a result of the opinion, both
congressional authority to make budget decisions according to Con-
gress's wishes, and the authority of congressional agents was limited.
The court found the law unconstitutional, not because it violated any
provision of the Constitution, but because "it violates the fundamental
103. At his confirmation hearings, Justice Scalia asserted in his introductory remarks that the
structural aspects of the Constitution were far more important for the preservation of a free democ-
racy than were the Bill of Rights. He noted that the Soviet Constitution has some language similar
to that in the Bill of Rights, but without procedural checks such language could not restrain the
despotic tendencies of any government leader. Confirmation Hearings, supra note 9, at 32.
104. For a summary of the current incoherence of Supreme Court doctrine in separation of
powers, see Pierce, Morrison v. Olsen [sic], Separation of Powers, and the Structure of Government,
1988 Sup. Cr. REv. 1, 9-21.
105. Justice Scalia believes in the use of dictionaries contemporary with the statute in question.
See, eg., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 719 (1988) (dissenting) (using 1785 edition of Johnson's
Dictionary to define "inferior"); cf Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1018 n.2 (1988) (majority) (explain-
ing that citations to Shakespeare and a speech by President Eisenhower "illustrate the meaning of
the [sixth amendment] term 'confrontation' "--although neither quotation uses that word).
106. 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion generally accepted Judge Scalia's logic, and also quoted from
a reference by Madison to Montesquieu, in The Federalist No. 47. 478 U.S. at 722.
107. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat.
1037 (1985).
Pursuant to the Act, § 274(a)(5), 2 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5), the case was tried by a three-judge panel
including two judges from the District of the District of Columbia, and a third judge from the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. In part because of the academic nature of the per
curiam opinion, many commentators assumed that Justice Scalia was its primary author. See, e.g.,
Wilson, Constraints of Power: The Constitutional Opinions of Judges Scalia, Bork, Posner, Easter-
brook and Winter, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1171, 1201 (1986) ("Scalia is rumored to have written
most, if not all, of the unisgned, per curiam decision .... ").
108. 626 F. Supp. at 1404.
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principal expressed by Montesquieu upon which the theory of separated
powers rests." 109 Besides attributing the idea to Montesquieu, the Court
buttresses it with an ambiguous quotation from Federalist No. 48.110 As
further authority for this opinion's concededly unique theory of separa-
tion of powers, the decision included a lengthy citation to an article by a
"respected scholar" who took an originalist approach to a different sepa-
ration of powers question and relied heavily on secondary sources. 1'
2. Young, and Morrison v. Olson. Justice Scalia's first Supreme
Court opinion on separation of powers appears as a concurrence in
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils. 112 There, the issue was
whether a district court had the power to appoint a special prosecutor to
pursue a criminal contempt charge arising from violation of a court-or-
dered civil injunction when the special prosecutor had previously repre-
sented the opposing party in the underlying civil action. Justice
Brennan's majority opinion held that this practice should be stopped by
use of the Supreme Court's supervisory powers," 3 and Justice Black-
mun's concurrence viewed the practice as a violation of the criminal de-
fendant's right to due process." 4 Only Justice Scalia understood the
issue as a question of separation of powers: Could the typically Execu-
tive function of initiating a prosecution be left to an official appointed by
the Judiciary? Justice Scalia begins with a discussion of Hamilton's Fed-
eralist No. 78, which states that the judiciary "has no influence over
either the sword or the purse."'" 5 Justice Scalia takes this authority, to-
gether with Hamilton's approving citation of Montesquieu to the effect
that separating the Judiciary from the Legislative and Executive powers
is necessary to secure liberty, and concludes that the judiciary has no
inherent power to appoint a special prosecutor in any situation, regard-
less of the equities of a particular case. 116
109. Id. at 1401.
110. Id. at 1402 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 327 (J. Madison) (P. Ford ed. 1898)).
The quoted portion is: "[N]one of [the branches] ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overrul-
ing influence over the others, in the adminstration of their respective powers." By itself, this passage
equally supports the argument that the Supreme Court has no power to declare an act of Congress
unconstitutional.
111. Id. at 1403-04 (citing Krattenmaker, Article III and Judicial Independence: Why the New
Bankruptcy Courts Are Unconstitutional, 70 GEO. L.J. 297, 301-02, 311 (1981)).
112. 481 U.S. 787, 815 (1987) (concurring in the judgment).
113. Id. at 789 (Brennan, J., majority).
114. Id. at 814 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
115. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 522-23 (. Cooke ed. 1961).
116. Young, 481 U.S. at 818-19.
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Young foreshadows Scalia's lonely dissent in Morrison v. Olson, 117 in
which he argued that Congress may not delegate the power of appointing
a special prosecutor to anyone other than an agent of the Executive. He
began with a citation to the Massachusetts Constitution for the proposi-
tion that other political bodies writing constitutions when the United
States Constitution was written believed in strong enforcement of separa-
tion of powers principles. To buttress the point that at least one framer
of the federal Constitution also felt separation of powers was important,
he cites several Federalist Papers. 118 Justice Scalia notes that proposals
for multiple Executives were rejected at the Constitutional Convention,
as if that information makes the obvious point that there is one President
seem more important. Moving on to review of Congress's decision, he
draws from another of Madison's Federalist Papers for the standard of
review.1 9 From there, he returns to the small amount of constitutional
text on Executive functions to give substance to the definition: "In what
other sense can one identify 'the executive power' that is supposed to be
vested in the President ... except by reference to what has always and
everywhere-if conducted by Government at all-been conducted never
by the legislature, never by the courts, and always by the executive. ' 120
Later in the opinion, Justice Scalia attempts to limit the meaning of
the term "inferior officer" of the United States (who may be appointed by
the judiciary)1 21 by appealing to a 1785 dictionary definition. He con-
cludes that the term means "subordinate,"' 122 in part because Hamilton
defined it that way in Federalist No. 81.123 Then Justice Scalia returns to
the Constitutional Convention debates to prove that some members
thought inferior officers did not need to be mentioned because that power
to appoint such offices is implicit in the enumerated powers. This per-
spective, Justice Scalia asserts, proves that the inferior officers authorized
could not be anyone important. Since he assumes that a special prosecu-
117. 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (dissenting). In Morrison, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion upheld the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, mandating the appointment of special prose-
cutors to investigate alleged criminal activities by executive officials.
118. THE FEDERALISTS Nos. 47, 51 and 53 (cited at id. 697-705). He later cites Hamilton's
THE FEDERALISr No. 70, for the general view that the President has a moral and a practical respon-
sibility to the people of the nation. Id. at 729.
119. Id. at 704-05. As he notes, this discussion is completely irrelevant, because the majority
opinion used the same standard of review.
120. Id. This definition does not invalidate the office of the special prosecutor, since the appoint-
ment of special prosecutors has been left outside of the executive branch at other times.
121. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
122. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 719-21. Since the dictionary offers two definitions, and "subordinate"
is the second, it would have been equally valid to assume that "inferior" meant "lower in ... value
or excellency." In that case, a special prosecutor would clearly be an inferior officer.
123. Id. at 720 ("In Federalist No. 81, Hamilton pauses to describe the 'inferior' courts author-
ized by Art. III as inferior in the sense that they are 'subordinate' to the Supreme Court.").
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tor would be someone very important to the founders, the appointment
of special prosecutors cannot be allowed. 124 Unfortunately, this circui-
tous logic ends with a position that the first century of American judges
would not have understood, since private, not executive, prosecution was
the norm in the colonial period, and independent prosecutors were com-
mon in the early days of the Republic.1 25
3. Mistretta. Justice Scalia's other important separation of pow-
ers dissent is Mistretta v. United States, in which the Court affirmed the
constitutionality of the United States Sentencing Commission.1 26 The
Commission included federal judges, and their recommendations on
criminal sentences became law pursuant to the authorizing statute.
Here, the problem for Scalia appeared to be excessive delegation of
power. To demonstrate the issue mattered to the Framers, Justice Scalia
pointed to a theoretical work written nearly a century before the Consti-
tution, John Locke's Second Treatise of Government, which asserted that
a legislature may make laws but not legislators. 127 He also considers the
Framers' intentions in order to refute the majority's reading of Federalist
No. 47.128 Again, although the Constitution nowhere forbids Congress
from delegating authority, Justice Scalia believes such a delegation is un-
constitutional because an authority on which the Framers might have
relied considered this delegation beyond the powers of the legislative
branch. This logic prevents Congress from deciding proper sentences for
convicted criminals in the manner that it chose. Congress's power
shrinks, and that of federal judges increases.
4. Eleventh Amendment: Pennsylvania v. Union Gas. In Penn-
sylvania v. Union Gas, Justice Scalia dissented in part from the Court's
holding that the Superfund legislation allowed Union Gas to file a claim
124. Justice Scalia also examines the legislative history of the Independent Prosecutor Act in this
opinion, in part to demonstrate that it will be more difficult to fire Morrison than the majority
suggests. Id. at 2627. This contradicts his own rule for determining the constitutionality of statutes,
set forth in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 637 (1987) (dissenting), that legislative history is of
no use. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
125. Note, Is Prosecution a Core Executive Function? Morrison v. Olson and the Framers'Intent,
99 YALE L.J. 1069, 1071-72, 1082-88 (1990). For an argument that Justice Scalia's formalist ap-
proach to separation of powers issues in this case contradicts both the theory and the practices of the
late eighteenth century, see Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional
Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 643-46.
126. 109 S. Ct. 647, 675 (1989) (dissenting).
127. J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 87 (R. Cox ed. 1982).
128. Id. at 682 (quoting from THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 325-26 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed.
1961)). Justice Scalia does not hesitate to divine Madison's reaction to Justice Blackmun's interpre-
tation: "He would be aghast .. " Id. at 683.
V/ol. 1990:160]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in federal court.129
Although Justice Scalia agreed that the legislation authorized such a
claim, he argued that the eleventh amendment 130 renders such claims
unconstitutional. Justice Scalia conceded:
If [the eleventh amendment] were intended as a comprehensive de-
scription of state sovereign immunity in federal courts . . .then it
would unquestionably be most reasonable to interpret it as providing
immunity only when the sole basis of federal jurisdiction is the diver-
sity of citizenship that it describes .... Unless some other constitu-
tional principle beyond the immediate text of the Eleventh
Amendment confers immunity... sovereign immunity would not exist
so long as one of the other, nondiversity grounds of jurisdiction
existed. 131
Thus, if the eleventh amendment were a statute (by its language, it
could well be a part of the statute conferring diversity jurisdiction on the
federal court), then the inquiry would be over according to Justice Scalia.
But since we are looking at the Constitution, we must look for another
"constitutional principle."1 32 No other constitutional clause appears to
fit the situation; the best candidate is article III, section 2, which allows
for "judicial power" over "all cases, in Law and Equity, arising under...
the Laws of the United States . . .or between a State and Citizens of
another State." Despite this grant of authority arising from the text, Jus-
tice Scalia finds that a different "constitutional principle" should decide
the case: sovereign immunity.13 3 Because the eleventh amendment, ac-
129. 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2276 (1989) (Brennan, J., plurality).
130. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
131. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2296 (concurring in part and dissenting in part). At least one
scholar has reached the opposite conclusion from the text itself. Lawrence Marshall, Fighting the
Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1342, 1347 (1989) (noting that the text
refers to "any suit in law or equity").
132. In Union Gas, Justice Scalia interprets both a statute and the eleventh amendment. Thus,
his opposing approaches appear especially clear. Compare "It is our task, as I see it, not to enter the
minds of the Members of Congress-who need have nothing in mind in order for their votes to be
both lawful and effective- but rather to find fair and reasonable meaning to the text of the United
States Code .. ", 109 S. Ct. at 2296 with "the Eleventh Amendment was important not merely for
what it said but for what it reflected.., the understood background against which the Constitution
was adopted .... Id. at 2297.
133. "Sovereign immunity" is a constitutional principle to Justice Scalia, even though it never
appears in the text. The concept does appear in Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisolm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 449-50 (1793), which Justice Scalia, following Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890), believes provides the true meaning of the eleventh amendment. Although the eleventh
amendment was passed in order to overrule the Chisholm decision, it is unclear why Justice Iredell's
dissent has any special power. Compare Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109 S. Ct. 939, 947 (1989) (concur-
ring in part) (asserting that the Supreme Court, when interpreting a statute, should accord no weight
to a congressional committee report endorsing particular cases); see supra text accompanying notes
11-13, 68.
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cording to Justice Scalia, was meant not merely to limit diversity juris-
diction but also to incorporate the concept of state sovereign immunity
into constitutional limits of federal court jurisdiction,13 4 federal courts
have no jurisdiction over a Superfund indemnity claim against a state.
Thus, Justice Scalia follows the originalist approach even in interpreting
an amendment to the Constitution (which, after all, he said is like a stat-
ute), notably an amendment that sounds like a statute, and he concedes
in his opinion that a textualist should reach the opposite result. The de-
cision makes federal courts unavailable to citizens whose statutory rights
have been violated by their state governments.
B. Effect on Balance Between Legislative and Judicial Branches
An originalist judge must begin with inquiry into the constitutional-
ity of legislation from the attitude of the Framers. An originalist refuses
to defer to another contemporary decisionmaker concerning the constitu-
tionality of a particular law or action because what matters is not what
the decisionmaker believed, but rather what the Framers (or the authors
of the Federalist Papers) thought. Thus, the fact that Congress believed
an enactment to be within its jurisdiction merits no particular deference.
Justice Scalia articulates this principle explicitly in the Morrison v. Olson
dissent:
It is rare in a case dealing, as this one does, with the constitutionality
of a statute passed by the Congress of the United States, not to find
anywhere in the Court's opinion the usual, almost formulary caution
that we owe great deference to Congress' view that what it has done is
constitutional.... That caution is not recited by the court in the pres-
ent case because it does not apply.... [W]here the issue pertains to
separation of powers, and the political branches are (as here) in disa-
greement, neither can be presumed correct. 135
This logic is clearly at odds with the reasoning Justice Scalia applies
when an administrative agency appears to have overstepped its statutory
powers-there "it is settled law that the rule of deference applies even to
an agency's interpretation of its own statutory authority or jurisdic-
tion." 136 Thus, in Justice Scalia's universe, only unelected officials may
Justice Scalia also cites a 1934 Supreme Court decision, Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313,
322-23 (1934), that relied on the version of sovereign immunity described in THE FEDERALIST No.
81. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2297.
134. Thus the eleventh amendment means that a federal court considering a claim against a state
should presume that the state would have been immune from suit in its own courts in this claim, and
dismiss the case on that basis. The distance between that interpretation and the text, see note 130
supra, is obvious.
135. 487 U.S. 654, 703-05 (1988) (dissenting).




decide the limits of their own authority without interference from the
courts.
Originalism also makes a Supreme Court Justice's particular theory
of the Constitution more important: If a Justice believes the law would
not have been approved by the Framers, then a law has no effect, regard-
less of its historical or substantive significance. As a result, an originalist
may have relatively little respect for the doctrine of stare decisis. 137
C. Effect on Balance Between Legislative and Executive Branches
As several of the cases demonstrate, Justice Scalia recognizes that
textualism with statutes reduces the power of individual Members of
Congress: Th~ey can no longer express their intentions effectively in any
way other than incorporating them in the legislation itself. Obviously,
this requirement means that all interpreters of legislation would have
fewer constraints than if they were expected to consider the original in-
tent of the legislators. For example, a judge would not need to follow the
cases Congress approved when deciding how to calculate attorney fees,
since he could do anything the broad words of the statutes will allow.138
This discretion benefits not only judges and Justices, but the Presi-
dent and the executive agencies that make administrative decisions im-
plementing (or failing to implement) legislation. Justice Scalia clearly
intends this result: Agents of the executive should have the authority to
interpret legislation as they choose. 139 Indeed, he occasionally has im-
plored executive agencies to ignore congressional intent whenever the ad-
ministration disagrees with it.140 If he were able to convince the
remainder of the Court to follow him, then both executive and judicial
agents, when it comes to deciding how to enforce a statute, would have
greater power than they now have.
137. Justice Scalia does not believe in the strongest versions of stare decisis, especially in the area
of constitutional decisions. See, eg., South Carolina v. Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207, 2217 (1989) (dis-
senting) (advocating overturning two-year old precedent in eighth amendment case, and allowing
victim impact statements to be considered at capital sentencing hearings); Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3066-67 (1989) (concurring in the judgment) (advocating overturning
Roe v. Wade).
138. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109 S. Ct. 939, 946-47 (concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); see supra text accompanying notes 11-13, 68.
139. United States v. Stuart, 109 S. Ct. 1183, 1196 (1989) (concurring).
140. Scalia, supra note 54, at 513 (citing S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 90-91 (1941)).
Interestingly, Justice Scalia bases this principle on a conceded imputation of legislative intent. Id. at
517.
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D. The Message to Administrative Decisionmakers
Justice Scalia believes that the Supreme Court should be conscious
of its position within the United States government; its decisions not only
decide the cases before it but also communicate with other branches of
government and with the people. 141 But this perspective should apply
equally to the legislative branch and suggests an appropriate role for leg-
islative history.
One reason Members of Congress create committee reports is to
communicate with the administrative agencies that exercise statutory re-
sponsibility for promulgating rules and enforcing the laws. Whether or
not information in a report is legally binding, it is the best evidence avail-
able to the administrator of the views held by those who wrote the stat-
ute. This evidence can be a valuable starting point for the agency, even if
they assume some discretion over the matter.142 Agency administrators
are aware that suggestions in the legislative history were intended to
guide them, and they should know they may be called to explain their
actions if they fail to act in accordance with Congress's will. 143
Justice Scalia offers a contradictory, equally clear message: An ad-
ministrator may be called on to testify before Congress, but he has no
reason to be concerned about what he hears. 144 Because the words that
appear in the committee reports or in oral testimony are not part of a
properly enacted statute presented to the President, they have no signifi-
cance. According to Justice Scalia's view, testimony on the Hill, and of
correspondence between Congress and the agency, are just rituals.1 45
141. Thus, he defends the Chevron rule of deference to administrative decisionmakers as a clear
message to other decisionmakers. Scalia, supra note 54, at 516-18. On the other hand, he criticizes
Justice O'Connor's abortion jurisprudence for sending unclear and wrong messages to the American
people regarding the role of the Supreme Court in political decsionmaking. Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3065-66 (concurring in the judgment).
142. Justice Scalia uses such a passage of legislative history in Center for Auto Safety v. Peck,
751 F.2d 1336, 1350-51 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (majority).
143. See generally Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 59.
144. Nor need the administrator pay very much attention to what he says, since absolute
prosecutorial discretion should protect him from any perjury investigation by the Attorney Gen-
eral's office, and the independent counsel statute should be unconstitutional. After all, the underly-
ing controversy in Morrison v. Olson was a grand jury investigation for perjury before a
congressional committee. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 479 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd sub nom. Morrison
v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
145. For critical examinations of the informal give-and-take between Congress and administra-
tive agencies, see Hill, The Third House of Congress Versus the Fourth Branch of Government: The
Impact of Congressional Committee Staff on Agency Regulatory Decisionmaking, 19 J. MARSHALL L.
RaV. 247 (1986) (stressing that neither administrators nor committee staff are elected); Shaman, The
Use of Congressional Committee Reports in the Administrative Process, 6 IND. L. REv. 481 (1973)
(committee reports should have no authority).
The arguments relating to the fact that Congressmen act through their aids are unconvincing.
All government officials act through their staffs to varying degrees. As explained supra in note 10,
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Instead, agency administrators have only two sources for authority:
The statutes and the President.1 46 They have, of course, broad interpre-
tative authority over the statutes. At the same time, the President has
broad authority over the administrators: The Constitution permits no
administrative allocation of power unless the President retains the power
to appoint and to fire the officer.147 And this configuration of power
should please the Executive-a power-hungry President would give un-
qualified endorsement to such an allocation of authority. It is unsurpris-
ing that the Justice Department's Office of Legal Policy has endorsed the
views Justice Scalia espouses. 148
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia presented a theory of the Constitution in a recent
speech honoring President and Chief Justice Taft, that he attributed to
Taft but also appears to endorse as the proper approach given the Con-
stitution's place in historical context:
[T]he traditional English understanding of executive power, or, to be
more precise, royal prerogatives, was fairly well known to the founding
generation, since they appear repeatedly in the text of the Constitution
in formulations very similar to those found in Blackstone. It can fur-
ther be argued that when those prerogatives were to be reallocated in
whole or in part to other branches of government, or were to be limited
in some other way, the Constitution generally did so expressly. One
could reasonably infer, therefore, that what was not expressly reas-
signed would-at least absent some patent incompatibility with repub-
lican principles-remain with the executive.' 49
the fact that a President's aide or his astrologer recommended that the President veto a bill and
wrote the veto message, or that a clerk wrote a Supreme Court opinion, does not reduce the author-
ity of the written documents.
146. Logically, there is a third source of authority: the United States Constitution. An original-
ist agency head might well find that its agency could not perform a legislatively mandated function
because its performance of that function would violate the Constitution. For a description of a
controversy involving an agency's refusal to act on a law it believed unconstitutional, see P. SHANE
& H. BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 397-406 (1987) (Department of Defense refused
to comply with "stay" provision in Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, because it believed the
provision violated separation of powers; stay provision later found to be constitutional). See gener-
ally Note, The Authority of Administrative Agencies to Consider the Constitutionality of Statutes, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1682 (1977).
147. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 697.
148. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 31, at iii-v; see also OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY,
ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK (1987) (advocating that judges decide cases
according to "original meaning" of the Constitution).
149. Scalia, supra note 76, at 859-60.
An extended discussion of the difficulties a textualist should have with this interpretation is
beyond the scope of this Note. It appears to be inconsistent with the following portions of the text:
U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting Legislature power to "make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing powers"); id. art. II, §§ 2-3 (enumerating the
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Thus, the non-textual, historical context of the Constitution creates an
Executive with powers based on those of the British king, a legislative
branch with enumerated powers that can be exercised only by majority
or two-thirds votes (in the case of a veto),'50 and a judiciary with the
power to decide only "cases and controversies,"' 15 1 a judiciary which
must defer to the Executive's but not the Legislature's interpretations of
their own power.
Clearly, Justice Scalia's treatment of secondary sources for statutes
and the Constitution mirrors the hierarchy he assumes for the executive
and legislative branches. He uses outside sources regularly when they
tend to decrease the power of the Congress and abjures outside sources
when they increase the power of Congress.
It would be unfair to Justice Scalia to connect his belief in the
supremacy of the executive over the legislature to the fact that since he
has been on the bench, he has been facing executive actions by members
of his own political party and legislative actions by the opposition
powers of the executive, without any mention of royal prerogatives), and id. amend. X ("The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are re-
served to the States respectively, or to the people," not to the executive).
This interpretation also differs from the leading current historical interpretation of the meaning
of "executive power" at the time of the Constitution. See, eg., F. MCDONALD, Novus ORDO
SECLORUM 247-49 (1985) (with regard to Executive powers, "experience with colonial and state
governors was largely irrelevant"; the drafters "expressly rejected the [royal] prerogative as a
guide.")
Many non-textualists also would find this theory objectionable. A common argument for rein-
terpretation of the Constitution is that technological changes have increased opportunities for tyr-
anny by the executive branch, especially the executive's police force. Consider Justice Brandeis'
argument that warrantless wiretaps should be unconstitutional:
When the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were adopted, "the form that evil had thereto-
fore taken" had been necessarily simple. Force and violence were then the only means
known to man by which a government could directly effect self-incrimination.... But
"time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes." Subtler and
more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the government.
Discovery and invention have made it possible for the government, by means far more
effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in
the closet....
Moreover, "in the application of a Constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of
what has been, but of what may be." The progress of science in furnishing the government
with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire tapping .... Can it be that the
Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of individual security?
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473-74 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 2-34.
151. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 340-41 (1988) (dissenting) (arguing that a matter had become
moot after oral argument at the Supreme Court).
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party.' 52 Indeed, Justice Scalia has held similar views at least since he
was an Assistant Attorney General. 153
Still, the use of legislative history makes a difference. It affects the
outcome of Supreme Court decisions, but more importantly it affects the
decisionmaking process of administrative agencies, whose discretionary
judgments rarely will be reviewed by a court. Justice Scalia's approach,
if adopted by the agencies, will free the courts and the agencies from
constraints placed on them by Congress, yet it will maintain the con-
straints on Congress (and on state legislatures) created by the courts with
respect to constitutional interpretations. Although saving us from the
prospect of legislative tyranny, Justice Scalia's view makes it more diffi-
cult for the legislature to save the people from executive tyranny (or, for
that matter, judicial tyranny). Taken together, these rules of interpreta-
tion reduce the power of the most democratic branch of government,
thereby making America less a democracy and more a bureaucratic state.
When Justice Scalia reduces the ability of elective representatives to com-
municate with and coerce the executive branch, he is taking power away
from the people. Those who support granting the more democratic
branches of government a predominate role among the branches should
consider Justice Scalia's warning in Morrison v. Olson:
That is what this suit is about. Power.154
Arthur Stock
152. It will be interesting to see whether Justice Scalia modifies his stance in favor of executive
power when future executives no longer share his substantive political views. Cf Wolfman, Silver &
Silver, The Behavior ofJustice Douglas in Federal Tax Cases, 122 U. PA. L. REv 235 (1973) (tracing
Justice Douglas' gradual shift from defender of the government to the Justice most likely to oppose
it).
153. See 1976 Bicentennial Institute, supra note 64, at 684-98 (1976).
154. 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (dissenting).
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